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The premise is that we have peaked or are very close to peaking
in our global oil supplies and production. As we slide down the other
side of the bell-curve, the consequences will be profound and, for the
most part, unimaginable to many. As the name implies, the end of
sprawling suburban subdivisions is inevitable. Does it sound farfetched? The commentators make a compelling argument for why the
post-World War II American Dream of a single-family home on a cul-desac out in the middle of suburbia is unsustainable and ultimately a deadend.
Barrie Zwicker, a broadcaster, writer, and media critic since the
1970s, hosts a cast of very credible guests, including: James Howard
Kunstler, new urbanist and author of Home from Nowhere and The
Geography of Nowhere; Peter Calthorpe, urban designer and founder of the
Congress for the New Urbansim; Michael Klare, a professor of Peace and
World Security Studies at Hampshire College and author of Resource
Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict; Colin Campbell, author of The
Coming Oil Crisis and former geologist for Texaco, British Petroleum, and
Amoco; Kenneth Deffeyes, petroleum geologist and researcher for Shell
Oil; and Matthew Simmons, CEO of the world's largest Energy
Investment Bank, counting Haliburton as a client.
The film is about one hour and 15 minutes long, with great
footage from the 1940s and 1950s showing how The American Dream
evolved. The viewer might be left with any number of impressions-a
feeling of doom and helplessness, a sense of loss of a way of life that
many may assume is indestructible, or anger that the media and
government and others "in-the-know" are not informing the public
about the potential consequences, or hope. We can re-invent a new
American Dream, walkable, more compact communities that focus on
multi-use neighborhoods connecting people together- a more
sustainable future, less dependent on oil supplies. If nothing else, The
End of Suburbia will provoke discussion, so it is best not to view it alone.
REVIEWS
Capturing the Commons: Devising Institutions to Manage the Maine
Lobster Industry. By James M. Acheson. Lebanon, NH: University Press of
New England, 2003. Pp. 284. $29.95 cloth; $19.95 paper.
Impressively spanning the academic disciplines of anthropology,
economics, political science, and marine biology, Capturing the Commons,
by James M. Acheson, is a formidable scholarly study of Maine lobster
fishery management. Public choice theorists will find Capturing the
Commons especially valuable, as an array of abstract public choice
constructs come to life in Professor Acheson's explanation of
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cooperation, norm enforcement, and oceanic turf wars involving rival
"harbor gangs" of lobster fishers. Professor Acheson concludes with a
provocative but challengeable argument about the implications of his
analysis for common pool resource management.
Acheson begins by noting that Maine lobster fishery
management over the past three decades appears to be highly successful,
as catches have steadily increased to reach record levels in excess of 50
million pounds annually. The sharp contrast between this pattern and
the serious depletion of so many other oceanic fisheries suggests that
Maine lobster management might in some ways become a model for the
management of other species. Acheson acknowledges, however, that
biological, economic, and cultural characteristics of the lobster fishery
facilitate the conservation of this particular resource.
One characteristic of the fishery that facilitates conservation is
that Maine lobsters are most commonly caught with traps. The traps
can-and must now by law-employ escapes that discriminate
effectively between legal lobsters, and those that are illegal because they
are undersized and have not yet bred. Additionally, fishers can readily
identify egg-bearing female lobsters hauled up in traps and return them
to the ocean unharmed, along with any undersized lobsters that
somehow fail to escape from a trap. A fisher with a recognized right to
fish a particular territory can expect eventually to harvest many of the
undersized and egg-bearing lobsters that he or she releases, as lobsters
are primarily a sedentary rather than a migratory species.
Most Maine lobsters live within a few miles of the coast in
relatively shallow water. Thus, Maine lobster fishing is most efficiently
conducted from locally owned boats that venture out of local harbors
daily. Stakes in the fishery are high; along with tourism, it supports
virtually the entire Maine coastal economy. Fishing families operating in
a locality normally know each other well and monitor each other readily.
In many cases, they have relationships that extend over several
generations. They have organized into informal associations known as
"harbor gangs."
These harbor gangs control oceanic territories corresponding to
sections of coastline. Within their territories, the gangs restrict access to
fishing grounds, reserving choice inshore areas exclusively for members
of the gang, but normally allowing some degree of outsider penetration
into offshore waters. The gangs also encourage compliance with
conservation laws and local norms of fishing conduct. To enforce their
territorial claims, and to punish violations of laws and norms, the gangs
will interfere with the operation of fishing gear deployed by interlopers.
Sometimes, the gangs find it necessary to escalate these measures, with
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the cutting of offending traps away from their buoys once being a
common practice.
Historically, territorial control by these harbor gangs amounted
to a partial privatization of what otherwise would have been a common
pool resource. This partial privatization of the lobster beds did not,
however, prevent a sharp drop off in catches in the 1930s. The causes of
this 1930s "bust" have not been established definitively. Perhaps
privatization did not provide incentive for conservation as in theory it
should, but it is also possible that water temperature changes reduced
lobster reproduction, or that size regulations were not enforced
effectively, or that something else caused the fishery to crash. In any
case, discussions within and among harbor gangs did set in motion the
formation of cooperative alliances in the 1940s and 1950s. These alliances
petitioned the state of Maine successfully for new regulations, and these
regulations halted certain fishing practices highly destructive to the
resource, enabling it to recover.
As the value of the annual lobster catch began to increase under
these regulations after World War II, newcomers and part timers
wedged their way into the fishery, and law enforcement officers began to
crack down on trap cutting. Consequently, territorial control by harbor
gangs became less effective, and the gangs and other segments of the
industry lobbied for state regulations to protect their interests.
Simultaneously, the national government became more interested in the
fishery, partly because of its potential impact on the endangered Right
Whale. The result has been a protracted struggle over both the form of
resource management and the substance of management policy.
On one side of the dispute over management are the long
established fishers such as those of the harbor gangs, along with
sympathetic officials from the state of Maine. These fishers and their
supporters have favored highly decentralized regulation, adhering
closely to the recommendations of fishers on local advisory councils.
Acheson calls this regime "co-management." It differs not greatly from a
pattern political scientists sometimes characterize as "self regulation" by
an industry. Regulations favored by the local advisory councils have
varied, and there continues to be little consensus over important issues
such as limits on the number of traps that each fisher can deploy.
There has been, however, broad advisory council support for
two forms of regulation, both designed to protect breeding stock. One is
a "slot limit" size regulation, so that neither the lobsters too small yet to
breed nor the very large lobsters that breed prodigiously can be taken
legally. The other widely supported regulation buttresses the voluntary
"V-notching" program promoted by the harbor gangs. A V-notch is a
small V-shaped section cut from the tail or flipper of a legally sized, egg-
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bearing female lobster. Regulations have long required the release of
egg-bearing females caught in traps, but prior to the institution of Vnotching, these lobsters once again became legal prey as soon as the eggs
hatched. Now, under the V-notch regulation, females that have been
trapped and V-notched when bearing eggs remain protected so long as
the V-notch remains visible -normally for at least two molting cycles,
each one potentially a breeding cycle.
Marine biologists from federal and state agencies favor radically
different management than the fishers do. For nearly three decades, they
have argued that the Maine lobster population is overfished, living on
borrowed time, and is almost certain to collapse unless regulations are
tightened. The scientists regard neither the V-notching nor the existing
size restrictions as adequate to protect the breeding stock. They note that
when lobsters reach the legally catchable size of 3.25 inches carapace
length-from the eye to the back of the body shell-only about ten
percent of the females are sufficiently mature to bear eggs. Very few
Maine lobsters manage to grow much beyond this length before they are
trapped and kept; virtually the entire catch consists of lobsters that
barely exceed 3.25 inches. Thus, the biologists think as many as 90
percent of the females are harvested before they bear eggs or have a
chance to be V-notched. The scientists have also maintained that a
maximum size limit of five inches is biologically insignificant because
lobsters of that size are so rare. For decades, these scientists have pressed
for a 3.5-inch minimum size, and no maximum. This would allow more
than half the females to reproduce before they are caught legally.
The fishers have opposed the scientists' proposals vociferously.
They complain that lobsters over 3.5 inches are not as easy to market as
3.25-inch lobsters, and they undoubtedly recognize also that a 3.5-inch
limit would reduce catches in the short term. Meanwhile, the record
catches of recent years have undermined the credibility of the scientists,
giving the fishers more political leverage to fight off the 3.5-inch limit.
The scientists attribute the record catches partly to short-term biological
factors such as favorable water temperatures, and partly to greater
"fishing effort" - more and better traps in the water, more fishing in
waters farther offshore, a longer season, and better technology. Some of
the scientists now also acknowledge that the current regulations may
protect the breeding stock more effectively than they had previously
estimated. Many remain concerned, however, that the Maine lobster
fishery is imperiled.
Acheson explains this scientific controversy thoughtfully. He
suggests several possible reasons for the discrepancy between the
scientists' projections and the apparent resilience of the fishery. Clearly,
some of the methods used to collect data and to model the health of the
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fishery have been questionable. For example, population studies have
been based on lobster samples captured relatively close to shore where
large, prolific breeders are proportionally less common than they are
further offshore. There is also much about the fishery that is not well
understood scientifically, such as the impact that cod predation may
have on juvenile lobster populations. The fishers rank diminished cod
predation as the most important reason for the lobster catch increases of
recent years. Scientists doubt that this is true. They note that cod had
essentially disappeared from coastal Maine waters long before the
significant lobster catch increases of the nineties.
All of this leads Acheson to conclusions that will distress many
scientists and federal policy makers. Acheson believes that uncertainties
in the scientific analysis of the Maine lobster fishery are so
overwhelming that the fishery is scientifically incomprehensible -nearly
"chaotic." Accordingly, he maintains that regulators should abandon the
notion that science should dictate policy. Acheson also seems to equate
the scientific determination of policy with a centralized, "top-down"
pattern of policy administration, and he generalizes his conclusions
about the Maine lobster fishery into a broad indictment of all centralized,
top-down resource management policies.
The logic and evidence supporting this general indictment of
centralized, top-down scientific policy are much less compelling than
Acheson's analysis of the Maine lobster fishery as a specific case.
Political circumstances have bundled together questionable science and
efforts to manage the Maine lobster fishery on a centralized basis, but the
determination of policy through science does not of necessity require
administrative centralization. Acheson appears not to consider the
possibility that sound science could be implemented into good policy on
a decentralized basis. Quite conceivably, administrative structures are
most likely to generate sound science when they are well matched to the
scope of a biological system, and administrative decentralization may
often be scientifically preferable to administrative decentralization, as
experience with the Maine lobster fishery indicates.
Additionally, Acheson's claim that scientifically based,
centralized top-down policy has failed in the case of the Maine Lobster
fishery is inaccurate. The top down policy advocated by federal scientists
has neither failed nor succeeded because it has never been implemented.
Attempts to implement it have repeatedly resulted in political stalemate.
The failure has been one of top-down politics, not top-down policy.
Quite conceivably, if the top-down regulation establishing a 3.5-inch
minimum carapace length had been implemented in Maine ten yeas ago,
catches might be substantially larger than they are currently. And if the
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catches do drop in the future, as Acheson concedes they may, perhaps
the drop would prove to be less severe with a 3.5-inch limit in place.
Still, advocates of scientifically based, centralized, top-down
policy should consider Acheson's analysis carefully. In a pattern
consistent with public choice theory predictions, semi-privatization of
the Maine lobster fishery has fostered cooperation that appears to result
in comparatively successful resource management. But Acheson's
depiction of the political power configuration within the lobster industry
may make a more compelling case for decentralization than does public
choice theory. A variety of economic, social, and cultural characteristics
of the Maine lobster industry lead many within it to react to top-down
policy with suspicion and fierce resistance. Almost any attempt to
implement such a policy has been doomed from the onset.
Decentralization is the best option for Maine lobster management
because politically it is the only option. The Maine lobster fishery is not
anomalous in this regard; political hostility to centralized resource
management is closer to being the rule than the exception in the United
States. To inform policy successfully, science must contend more
effectively with decentralized politics than it has in the case of the Maine
lobster fishery.
Michael Lyons
Associate Professor, Political Science
Utah State University
The Choice Modelling Approach to EnvironmentalValuation. Edited by
Jeff Bennett & Russell Blarney. Northampton, MA & Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001. Pp. 269. $85.00 hardcover.
The current title is part of the publisher's series of works
designed to contribute to developments of practices and principles in the
field of environmental economics. The present volume introduces with
choice modeling a technique that is meant to estimate the demand for
environmental goods (e.g., wetlands) and the benefits and costs
associated with them. Its editors (and major contributors) succeed in
structuring the book into four distinct and logical parts.
Bennett and Blamey provide a detailed introduction to the
choice modeling technique in the environmental context. In the last 25
years, a growing interest in environmental choices and values has arisen
as a response to a growing relative scarcity of environmental goods and
services. The complexity of calculating monetary values attached to
environmental goods has prompted an interest among decision makers
to seek out more information about the choices available to communities.
A key component of that information relates to the above-mentioned
values of environmental outcomes. If these values could be estimated in

